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Discovery of Liability Insurance Under New Rules
A question now dividing both federal courts and state courts
which have adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is whether
in a tort action the plaintiff can compel the defendant to disclose
the limits of his liability insurance through pre-trial discovery.
Usually the question develops in an action arising from an auto-
mobile collision and involves automobile liability insurance. The
problem has developed around Federal Rule 33, which provides for
written interrogatories between parties, and Federal Rule 34, which
provides for examination of documents, as limited by Federal Rule
26(b) which delineates the scope of both Rules 33 and 34.' In
particular the controversy centers around the interpretation of the
last sentence in Rule 26(b) which was added to the Federal Rules
in 1946 and which has been incorporated into the West Virginia
Rules.
"It is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inad-
missible at the trial if the testimony sought is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action and appears
reasonably calculated, and intended in good faith, to lead to
the discovery of evidence which will be admissible at the trial."
Courts permitting discovery of the limits of liability insurance have
reasoned that the matter is relevant to the subject matter within the
meaning of the rules, while those courts denying discovery con-
clude it is not relevant to the subject matter within the meaning of
the rule.
Though the courts and legal writers have indicated majority
holdings on the issue one way or the other, in accordance with the
decisions as of that date, or the position they were taking, at this
time the numerical division of the courts in deciding on the
question is so slight that there is no apparent majority holding. In
any event, an attempt at a statistical evaluation might prove mis-
leading in view of the different circumstances under which the
decisions were reached. Still a compilation and analysis of case
decisions on point and a discarding of those proving inapplicable
may provide some indication of the probable course the West
Virginia court will follow. It is necessary to approach the prior
decisions in an inductive manner because both the proponents
and the opponents of allowing discovery in this area have been
'The same numbering is used in the West Virginia Rules.
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guilty of misinterpreting and incorporating prior court decisions
which did not conform with the immediate circumstances.
The California cases and in particular the case of Superior Ins.
Co. v. Superior Court,2 relied on by those who would permit dis-
covery of the limits of liability insurance provide an object example
of cases continually cited for this proposition, which are of little
merit in courts following the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Superior case and a prior California case,' both arose from a
similar factual situation. The plaintiff brought an action for injuries
resulting through an automobile collision. While that action was
pending, he sought to discover the limits of the defendant's liability
insurance under the California perpetuation of evidence statute, on
the basis that he expected to be a party to an action against the
defendant and the insurer on completion of the present action. The
court in both cases in allowing discovery as to the limits of the
defendant's liability insurance relied on a statutory provision
governing insurance contracts to determine that an automobile
liability policy evidences a contractual relationship inuring to the
benefit of persons negligently injured by the insured. The court in
the Superior case dismissed the defendant's contention that knowl-
edge of liability limits would give the plaintiff a tactical advantage
in negotiations for settlement. The dissent argued that the plaintiff
had no discoverable claim against the insurer until determination
of liability against the defendant, that the facts sought were not
germane to any issue, that the sole and obvious purpose was to
obtain information which would aid the plaintiff in negotiation for
a settlement. Once the court decided that the plaintiff could use
the perpetuation of evidence statute for discovery, no one would
argue that the matter of the limits of liability insurance would not
be relevant in a second proceeding joining the insured and the
insurer after the liability of the insured had been determined. The
question is whether the court was correct in deciding on the basis
of the perpetuation of evidence statute, yet few adversaries or
advocates in commenting upon these decisions refer to this under-
lying premise. California statutes of civil procedure at this time,
though comparable to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, were
not patterned after them. Had they been, an intervening federal
decision4 might have led the majority in the Superior case to develop
2 37 Cal.2d 749, 235 P.2d 833 (1951).
3 Demaree v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.2d 99, 73 P.2d 605 (1937).
4 Petition of Ferkauf, 3 F.R.D. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
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another foundation on which to allow discovery. In Petition of
Ferkauf5 the federal court held that Rule 27, FED. R. Civ. P., was
derived from old equity practice designed for the sole purpose of
perpetuating evidence and was not to be used as a discovery statute.
The Ferkauf decision should be applied in West Virginia as the
principal provisions of Rule 27 existed even prior to the promulga-
tion of the new rules of civil procedure under the West Virginia
Code' as derived from equity. In 1958 California revised its pro-
cedure statutes, patterning them after the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In Laddon v. Superior Court' the question came back
under these new rules to the California court in an action for
malpractice. The court, while it acknowledged the weight of
authority was to the contrary, felt bound by the two prior state
decisions8 but it discarded the premise on which they were based,
stating that the plaintiff is no longer required to institute ancillary
proceedings as a means of exercising discoverable interest in
the defendant's policy.'
Was there really something unique about California's statute
relating to insurance policies? Other jurisdictions, when confronted
with the Superior case, distinguished decisions prohibiting the use
of discovery on the basis that the California insurance statute was
unique."0 But in Johanek v. Aberle," a federal court concluded
that the policy requirements of the California statute exact nothing
more than the normal provisions of the standard automobile
liability policy.
Just as the California cases should be viewed with skepticism
in states operating under rules similar to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, there are decisions denying discovery which are equally
5 Ibid.
6 W. VA. CODE ch. 57, art. 4, § 7 (Michie 1961).
7 167 Cal. App. 2d 391, 334 P.2d 638 (1959).
8 Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 749, 235 P.2d 833 (1951);
Demarre v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.2d 99, 73 P.2d 605 (1937).
9 Accord, Pettie v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 2d 680, 3 Cal. Rptr. 267
(1960), automobile liability insurance.
10 State ex rel. Allen v. Second District Court, 69 Nev. 196, 245 P.2d 999
(1952). The court operating under similar code procedure refused to allow
the plaintiff the right to obtain information regarding automobile liability
insurance in a proceeding to perpetuate testimony. Peters v. Webb, 316 P.2d
170 (Okla. 1957). In this case, decided under similar code procedure, the
court likewise distinguished its decision on the basis of the California insurance
statute in disallowing discovery through the use of a perpetuation of evidence
statute in a malpractice action.11 27 F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont. 1961).
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inappropriate as authority. In Goheen v. Goheen,"2 probably the
earliest decision on point, the court denied the use of interrogatories
to discover limits of automobile liability insurance because discovery
at that time was limited to matters that would constitute relevant
and competent evidence at the trial. This was prior to the 1946
amendment to the federal rules already considered. Similarly, Bean
v. Best,'3 an action against a sheriff for false arrest, is equally
inappropriate as South Dakota had adopted the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure prior to this amendment and it was not subsequently
added to their rules. McKee v. Walker," a malpractice action, and
Verastro v. Grecco,'" arising from an auto collision, are also without
import as they were decided under procedural rules much more
narrow than the federal rules.
No court denies that discovery of insurance is proper where it
goes to the merits of the matter in litigation. Therefore, in Layton
v. Gregan & Mallory Co.,'6 where the plaintiff brought an action
against the defendant claiming his injuries resulted through the
negligence of a driver employed by the defendant and the defendant
denied ownership of the car, the court required the defendant to
produce the insurance policy. The court based its decision on the
circumstance that the ownership of the car was put in issue by the
pleadings. In reply to the defendant's argument that the matter of
insurance if presented before the jury would be prejudicial, the
court stated that the matter of insurance is only prejudicial where
not relevant and injected to prejudice the jury; the court will not
allow irrelevant portions of the policy to be introduced. No sub-
sequent decision has questioned the propriety of this holding on
these facts, but one seemingly misconstrued the holding as authority
for pre-trial discovery of liability limits.
1 7
The question of discovery as to the extent of liability insurance
first came to the courts operating under rules parallel to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, as they now exist in Orgel v. McCurdy.'8
Here, as in the Layton case, discovery was sought on the basis of
a contested issue as to operation and control of the motor vehicle;
however, the court went further than required and decided the
12 9 N.J. Misc. 507,154 At. 393 (1931).
'3 76 S.D. 462,80 N.W.2d 565 (1957).
14 21 Conn. Supp. 168, 149 A.2d 704 (1958).
Is 21 Conn. Supp. 165, 149 A.2d 703 (1958).
6 263 Mich. 30, 248 N.W. 539 (1933).
17 Laddon v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. App. 2d 391, 334 P.2d 638 (1959).
18 8 F.R.D. 585 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
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question on the ground that it was relevant within the broad
meaning of relevancy as used in Rule 26(b). Here was formed
the nucleus that has split both the federal and the state courts in
applying the discovery rules-an interpretation of the scope of
relevancy in light of the purposes of the discovery.
In Brackett v. Woodall Food Products, Inc.,'9 the plaintiff,
seemingly reluctant to rely on the sweeping decision of the Orgel
case, sought to examine the defendanfs automobile liability in-
surance contending that an examination was justified because
punitive damages were sought and therefore inquiry into the
defendant's financial condition was proper. The court dismissed
this contention, stating that insurance is not an asset of the estate
of the insured; rather it is purchased for protection against both
compensatory and punitive damages. It then relied on the nation-
wide trend of state legislation through enactment of safety respon-
sibility laws as manifesting an intent that automobile liability
insurance become a matter of public record.
The following year a federal district court decision" rejected
the holding of the Brackett case and denied the plaintiffs motion
to examine the defendanfs automobile liability insurance. The court
reasoned that every argument that could be made in favor of
disclosure could be made in any civil case to require the defendant
to furnish the plaintiff with full information as to his personal
wealth. The court admitted that the fact that the information
sought could not be introduced at trial did not necessarily disallow
discovery, but insisted that any advantages which the plaintiff
might gain had nothing to do with the presentation of his case.
With this decision the rift was formed. The difference in inter-
preting the meaning of relevancy within the purposes of discovery
procedure was the wedge dividing the courts. Decisions which
followed merely refined the reasoning of prior decisions or at-
tempted to advance variations or new arguments in support of
their determination as to relevancy.
Those courts favoring the use of discovery based their reasoning
on a loose construction of the term relevant in advancing the
following arguments. The insurance is relevant after the plaintiff
prevails and should therefore logically be relevant during pre-trial
'9 12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1951).20 McClure v. Boeger, 105 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
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investigation." State safety responsibility statutes confer an interest
in the defendant's liability insurance in every member of the public
negligently injured by the insured, thereby distinguishing insurance
from other personal assets. 2 Inquiry as to insurance is related to
the merits of the matter in litigation since it may apprise the
plaintiff of rights otherwise unknown arising out of the accident. 3
Discovery would encourage pre-trial settlements, thereby advancing
the modem judicial policy of prompt, economic and just settlements
of civil suits and relieve crowded court dockets." The insurer not
only defends the suit but also makes such investigation, negotiation
and settlement as it deems expedient; this active role of the insurer
is basis for allowing the plaintiff to discover his financial interest in
the action.2
Those courts disallowing discovery of insurance reply to these
arguments with equal logic. The discovery rules should be liberally
construed, but the purpose of discovery information is for use at the
trial or to lead to information for use at the trial; information regard-
ing insurance is not relevant to either of these purposes.26 A dis-
sent of the other faction best refuted the argument that safety
responsibility laws evidence a public policy conferring upon the
plaintiff an interest in the defendant's automobile liability insurance.
Safety responsibility laws do not require any individual motorist to
obtain automobile liability insurance. They do not effect the
motorist until he has become involved in an accident. Then the
relationship created by such a statute is between the individual
and the state and does not run to a third-party." If after the
plaintiff obtains a judgment against the insured the judgment execu-
tion is returned unsatisfied, the amount of insurance may then be
discovered. 8 Every reason that can be advanced to the effect that
such disclosure will aid in settlement can be rebutted with
equal logic; disclosure would render settlement more difficult and
increase the probability of trial.2 9 Discovery rules are designed to
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of an action,
21 Lucas v. District Court, 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959); Maddox
v. Grauman, 265, S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1954).22 People ex rel. Terry v. Fischer, 12 ll.2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957).23 Ibid.24 Ibid.
2 5 Johanek v. Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont. 1961).26 McNelly v. Perry, 18 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
2 Lucas v. District Court, 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959).2 8 J eppesen v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955).
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but that does not mean placing one party in a more strategic position
than another."0 The subject matter is the charge of negligence.
The plaintiff's claim must rise or fall on its own merits; the absence
or presence of insurance has no probative value. If the plaintiff
were allowed to discover the provisions of the defendant's liability
coverage, it would follow that he should be permitted the same
latitude as to the defendant's other assets. Though disclosure
might be conducive to settlement without litigation, such advantage
to the court and to the plaintiff does not outweigh the infringement
on the rights of the defendant. The fact that the court dockets are
congested has no bearing on the fundamental right of the defendant
to come into court and to litigate his claim on an equal footing with
the plaintiff.3"
Worthy of note is the division in Illinois. After the state court32
had determined discovery might be used to determine the amount
of defendant's liability insurance, two federal courts in that juris-
diction held that the discovery rules could not be used for that
purpose.3 The federal courts in Tennessee are divided over the
question.3 Contrariwise, a federal court in Kentucky,3" in the
absence of decision on the matter by the appellate court for that
circuit, felt bound by the state decision of Maddox v. Grauman"6
and permitted discovery of the defendant's liability insurance limits.
Two recent federal court decisions illustrate that the con-
troversy is very much alive and the split very real. Hill v. Greer3"
held that the plaintiff in an automobile negligence action could
compel the defendant through discovery procedure to reveal the
amount of his automobile liability policy. There is some indication
though that the court was influenced by a state statute requiring
disclosure of policy limits of liability insurance. This is in sharp
contrast to the Goheen v. Goheen38 decision in that jurisdiction
3 0 Ruark v. Smith 51 Del. 420, 147 A.2d 514 (1959); Brooks v. Owens, 97
So. 2d 693 (ma. 1957S.
31 Callimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. M11. 958). See generally, Di
Pietruntonio v. Superior Court, 84 Ariz. 291, 327 P.2d 746 (1958).32 People ex rel. Terry v. Fischer, 12 111. 2d. 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957).33 Gallhore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. IM. 1958); Roembke v. Wisdom,
22 F.R.D. 197 (S.D. Ill. 1958).34 Hillman v. Penny, 5 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 26b.31, Case 1 (E.D. Tenn.
Jan. 1962); McNeUy v. Perry, 18 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955); Brackett v.
Woodall Food Products, Inc., 12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Ten. 1951).3 5 Hurt v. Cooper, 175 F. Supp. 712 (W.D. Ky. 1959).36265 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1954).37 United States District Court of New Jersey, December 1961, opinion
as yet unpublished.
38 9 N.J. Misc. 507, 154 Aft. 393 (1931).
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which denied discovery on the basis that the information could
not be introduced at the trial. Hillman v. Penny, 9 the latest
decision, held that, while discovery rules are to be construed
liberally, a rule of reasonableness should be applied in arriving
at an interpretation and that the terms of an automobile liability
policy cannot reasonably be said to be relevant to the subject
matter in litigation.
In summary, decisions in the jurisdictions of California, Nevada,
Oklahoma, Connecticut, and New Jersey should not be considered
precedent in jurisdictions following rules like the present Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The decision of Layton v. Cregan Mallory
Co.4" establishes that discovery procedure may be used where the
absence or possession of insurance becomes relevant through issues
raised by the pleadings. There is a division on the matter between
the state and federal courts in Illinois, and between the federal
courts in Tennessee. The following judisdictions permit the use
of discovery to determine liability insurance coverage: Colorado,
Kentucky, Montana and New York. The following jurisdictions dis-
allow the use of discovery to determine the extent of liability
insurance; Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Minnesota, Pennsylvania,
South Dalcota.
There is no weight of authority on the matter. The West
Virginia court could conceivably follow the logic and reasoning
advanced by either side when the question is presented. However,
some anticipation may be afforded as to the course the West Virginia
court will follow through the consideration that allowance of dis-
covery to determine liability insurance limits is definitely a liberal
approach to the rules and West Virginia has been a common law
pleading state for a long time.
William Erwin Barr
39 5 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 26b.31, Case 1 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 1962).
40 263 Mich. 30, 248 N.W. 539 (1933).
[ Vol. 64
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [1962], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol64/iss4/7
